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The thirtieth anniversary of the October 1983 US military invasion of Grenada 
provides an opportunity to examine the role of the media in covering these events. Far 
from contemporary forms of embedded journalism where reporters are attached to the 
armed forces gaining unique access to information and benefitting from special 
protection, reporters in Grenada were neither authorised nor welcomed to accompany 
the armed forces in its military adventure to the Caribbean islands. On the contrary, 
the Pentagon ordered that journalists should not be allowed to enter the island for two 
days following the US invasion.  Even those who attempted to reach Grenada by boat 
were taken off the island, held for forty-eight hours and then released (Cassell, 
1985:944). The US government excluded the press from the battlefield through an 
access denial which imposed a prior restraint based on the national security exception, 
that is, a government restriction on expression which is meant to be protected by the 
First Amendment, based on national security grounds (Pincus, 1987). 
 
Grenada’s invasion represents an important case study of journalism in the frontline 
because it marked a changing point in the relationship between journalists and the US 
administration. The exclusion of news organizations and independent journalists at 
the time can be conceived of as a test in trying new forms of information 
management. The tensions experienced between journalists, government and military 
officers signalled the need to come up with alternative solutions to the problem of 
information coverage in wartime.  
 
Historical context 
Thirty years ago the United States invasion of Grenada was a major international 
news story. The New York Times headlines of October 26th 1983 read, “1,900 U.S. 
Troops, with Caribbean Allies, invade Grenada and fight leftist units; Moscow 
protests; British are critical” (Worrill 2003). In retrospect the rhetoric used by 
President Reagan and his administration in dubbing Grenada, Cuba and Nicaragua as 
the “Caribbean Triangle”, to justify the military actions, bears strong similarities to 
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the ‘axis of evil’ pronouncements of President George W Bush (Andersen, 2007) 
‘They imply a crucial connection without having to articulate or defend accusations 
that influential economic or political ties exist and have resulted in significant threat.” 
(p. 123).  
 
Why did the media blackout happen?  
For the invasion of Grenada or ‘Operation Urgent Fury’ as it became known, there 
was a clear and organised plan to control the information about events committed by 
US forces (Naparstek, 1993; Schoenfeld, 1992). Following a US Department of 
Defense’s order, reporters were not allowed to work from the island on the grounds of 
alleged safety reasons (Cassell, 1985:943). The New York Times reported in 1983 
that: ‘President Reagan said through a spokesman that reporters would be allowed 
onto the island when American military commanders determined that conditions were 
safe for them’ (p. 1). The extent to which this was a legitimate statement became 
controversial: ‘The argument about reporter safety is a weak one. Prior to Grenada, 
military conflicts were never considered too dangerous for the press to cover first-
hand; members of the media have taken their chances on the battlefield numerous 
times and were prepared to do so again in Grenada without the guarantees of 
government protection’ (Pincus, 1987:848)  
 
The chronology of the events can be summarised as follows: on 25th October 
Operation Urgent Fury began; the following day reporters were prevented from 
coming to Grenada so news came only from ham radio operators in the island; on 27th 
fifteen pool reporters were allowed for several hours and escorted to the island by 
military officers; on the following day a larger number of reporters were allowed to 
the island; and finally on 30th permission was granted to all media (Cassell, 1985). 
Driving the two-day exclusion of the press from Grenada, was the US Government’s 
reaction to potential press coverage that was perceived as threatening, together with 
their logistic needs to achieve military surprise, to concentrate on military objectives 
with no distraction from the press, and to have all troops available for the operation, 
that is, not occupied protecting reporters (Pincus, 1987:841-842).  
  
The Financial Times reported in 1983 that ‘the 300 journalists covering the events in 
Grenada are having to do so from the neighbouring island of Barbados’ (Financial 
 3 
Times, 1983: 6). Members of major news magazines, newspapers and TV channels 
were held captive by US forces at the Grantley Adams airport (Warden, 1988) until 
the military forces, five days after the beginning of the invasion, enabled journalists to 
gain access to the island (Cassell, 1985:944). 
 
Despite the US administration’s and commanders’ argument that secrecy was required 
in order to minimize the risk of the military operation and American lives, there was a 
clear objective to manipulate and manage the news by allowing only Pentagon press 
agents to work from the island (Cassell, 1985). There were some allegations that the 
authorities disseminated inaccurate, misleading and distorted information, such as 
misinformation about the whereabouts of Navy ships (Pincus, 1987), failure to 
disclose details about the bombing of a civilian mental hospital, and the distortion 
about the nature of the invading force (Cassell, 1985). ‘Because the Grenadian 
government had expelled virtually all Western reporters from the island one week 
before the invasion, the United States decision to exclude the press was a highly 
effective way of barring coverage of the operation’ (Pincus, 1987:846).  
 
The media blackout imposed during the Grenada invasion cannot be understood 
without considering the impact of the Vietnam War media coverage on the successive 
military actions during the decades that followed (Naparstek, 1993, Tumber, 2009).  
 
Under the shadow of the memories of the Vietnam coverage, the Reagan 
administration was determined to apply strict information control. This was directly 
connected with the perception of a media bias against official policies and foreign US 
interventions. According to politicians and commanders, a direct cause of the 
demoralised audiences and opposition to foreign policies in Vietnam were the 
uncensored reporting and unrestricted access to information by the media. For 
Governments and military, the lesson of the Vietnam War was that the media and 
television in particular, was to blame for the United States defeat in South East Asia. 
Commanders and politicians were convinced that the years of uncensored reporting, 
unrestricted access, and the mismanagement of military briefings in Saigon were 
directly responsible for providing information and succor to the enemy, for lowering 
morale at home and for losing the battle for public opinion.  It was a scenario that they 
believed must not be repeated in future conflicts. Since then they have experimented 
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with different methods of ‘controlling’ and ‘managing’ the media with stricter 
controls imposed on the media in order to contain information and ultimately win the 
battle for the hearts and minds of the public (Tumber, 2009).  
 
 
The Reagan administration was determined to avoid the Saigon experience by 
imposing strict control on information that they perceived could change the minds of 
the public. Military and defense officials in the United States noted the experience of 
the Falklands. The uses of both military and civilian minders, the stationing of 
reporters in military units, and pooling arrangements were all adopted in various 
guises in future conflicts. The information policy adopted by the British Government 
and the military during the Falklands though was poorly organized and lacked 
planning. There was an absence of agreed procedure or criteria, no centralized system 
of control and no co-ordination between departments. But whatever seemingly ‘on the 
hoof’ measures the British introduced was based on the ‘myth’ of Vietnam.  
 
Indeed the New York Times was clear about the link with the Falklands War. In an 
article headed “MILITARY VS. PRESS: TROUBLED HISTORY” the paper stated: 
‘The Reagan Administration's restrictions on news coverage of the invasion of 
Grenada has its immediate source in the military's resentment about broadcast and 
published reports on the Vietnam War. (...) no independent reporters were on hand to 
question the Army spokesmen (New York Times, 1983a). 
 
During the Falklands conflict, the battle for public opinion was fought under the guise 
of ‘operational security’, an all-embracing term used as an excuse for delaying and 
censoring information and disseminating misinformation (see Morrison & Tumber, 
1988, pp. 189-190). But whatever the outcomes of the reporting, it was not due to 
astute planning by the British. The news was controlled by the location of the 
Falklands. For the media it was in the wrong place. British journalists were only able 
to get their reports back through the military’s communications network (see 




As the New York Times wrote within the same article: ‘A former public relations 
officer said ''the Falkland business gave us a useful pointer'' on how a limited war 
operation might be handled. He noted that the British kept the number of 
correspondents with the task force down to a minimum and were discreet about the 
information they passed out. He said also that they actively censored pictures and 
dispatches going back to London. The difference between the Falklands and Grenada 
is that no reporters were allowed to land with the first wave of American troops’ 
(New York Times, 1983a). 
 
The blackout of press coverage of Operation Urgent Fury in October 1983 was part of 
a plan to evade the likely negative impact of military actions which may not have 
ended as initially expected (Sharkey, 2001). The lack of information about the 
location of the US medical students on the Island who supposedly were a main 
priority in the operation, the confusions about the enemy’s identities, the killing of 
hospital patients by mistaking civilians for military targets, and the inadequate 
military equipment of troops in the ground1 reinforced the application of the plan to 
control the flow of information. 
 
By excluding journalists and independent film and television footage, the US 
administration secured the management and release of pictures thereby constituting 
the only evidence of the first two days of the Urgent Fury operation. The US audience 
could only receive what the Pentagon camera crews supplied. Film of warehouses 
appearing to be stacked with automatic weapons was used to verify claims over 
imminent terrorist threats coming from Grenada (Andersen, 2007). While hundreds of 
reporters were waiting in Barbados to gain access no independent journalists were in 
Grenada to corroborate the ‘official’ information. The US administration was so 
concerned with secrecy that Larry Speakes, the then White House press secretary was 
not informed about the invasion until shortly after it began (Campbell, 1989:28). In 
contrast local radios in Grenada had already warned about an imminent invasion to 
the island (Campbell, 1989:28). When Larry Speakes and the White House press 
officers were asked by journalists about this rumour, they promptly denied it. As a 
result, press officers were furious that they had not been informed and consequently 
                                                 
1
  Soldiers had to use tourist maps instead of military ones to move across the island (Sharkey, 2001). 
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may have misled journalists. The Deputy White House Press Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, Les Janka, resigned just after the Urgent Fury operation, arguing that the 
“credibility of White House press officials had been compromised. There were 
rumours that Speakes had discussed resigning over the matter, but Speakes denied 
this” (Campbell, 1989:30). 
 
The media blackout in Grenada created a clear distrust among journalists. The New 
York Times of the 26th October 1983 headlined: ‘REPORTING THE NEWS IN A 
COMMUNIQUE WAR’ and wrote: ‘Journalists, many sent recently to Bridgetown, 
Barbados, 150 miles from Grenada, have been unable to get firsthand confirmation of 
information on such matters as the extent of casualties in the invasion or the situation 
of United States students and tourists caught in the upheaval. (...) Supervising editors 
said they had faced the ''communique war'' situation before - in the war over the 
Falkland Islands last year, in the fighting between Iran and Iraq, and in the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. They said those experiences made them particularly wary of 
efforts by a government to minimize reports of its casualties and maximize accounts 
of damage to enemy forces. '' (Friendly, 1983). 
 
The criticism continued with the New York Times the next day, 27th October, 
reporting: ‘U.S. BARS COVERAGE OF GRENADA ACTION; NEWS GROUPS 
PROTEST’ - ‘Howard Simons, managing editor of The Washington Post, said: ''I'm 
screaming about it because writing letters takes too long. I think a secret war, like 
secret government, is antithetical to an open society. It's absolutely outrageous.'' (...) 
Seymour Topping, managing editor of The New York Times, said, ''We have 
strenuously protested to the White House and the Defense Department about the lack 
of access to the story in Grenada by our correspondents who are waiting on Barbados. 
We also are disturbed by the paucity of details about the operation released by the 
Pentagon at a time when the American people require all the facts to make judgments 
about the actions of our Government'' (Gailey, 1983). 
 
The press criticism of the Reagan administration’s policy continued. On the 28th 
October the New York Times stated: ‘THE GRENADA INVASION - Furor rages as 
U.S. hobbles press coverage’ and wrote:  ‘WASHINGTON - The Reagan 
Administration permitted a pool of reporters to go to Grenada for the afternoon 
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yesterday as a furor continued over the limitations imposed on news coverage of the 
invasion of the Caribbean island. (...) The Administration's assertion that it had not 
permitted reporters to go to the island, where a military operation by United States 
and Caribbean forces continued for a third day, until military commanders had 
determined that it was safe for them, was sharply criticized in both Congress and the 
media. (...)(New York Times, 1983b).  
 
Unsurprisingly, the exclusion of the media and the lack of response to journalists’ 
logistic needs provoked an outcry from news organizations. As a result, an open 
conflict with these organisations and a controversy about the media blackout were 
installed in the public domain (Schoenfeld, 1992). The official decision, to bar 
reporters, affecting media coverage was contested by news organisations who 
severely criticised the Government using editorial complaints and a lawsuit (Cooper, 
2003). The former appeared in The New York Times and The Times, among others, 
during the week that followed the invasion, emphasising the right to free speech and 
public access to information.  
 
‘The American Society of Newspaper Editors said the restrictions on coverage 
imposed by the Reagan Administration ''go beyond the normal limits of military 
censorship.'' Jerry Freidheim, executive vice-president of the American Newspaper 
Publishers Association, said the limitations were ''unprecedented and intolerable,'' and 
asked that Congress investigate what he called a ''policy of secret wars hidden from 
the American people.'' (...)The Reagan Administration's policy on coverage has 
caused considerable consternation and suspicion among editorial writers and 
commentators. ''The Reagan Administration has produced a bureaucrat's dream,'' said 
John Chancellor of NBC news. ''Do anything, no one is watching''.’ (New York 
Times, 1983b)  
 
The lawsuit (Flynt v. Weinberger, 1994) claimed violation of the First Amendment in 
the exclusion of reporters from Grenada, but was finally dismissed by the court for 
being considered ‘moot’ (Cassell, 1985:948; Cooper, 2003). The general public 
seemed to back the official decision of denial of press access, as the letters to NBC 
running ten-to-one against admitting the press showed (Cassell, 1985:945). However 
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the US commanders and politicians had to respond to the fundamental right of the 
public to be informed.  
The mistrust of the administration by the media was sealed despite reporting access 
eventually being established. 
How was the blackout possible?  
The geo-location of Grenada played an important role in the media blackout. In the 
1980’s the existing technologies required an infrastructure which was restricted by its 
cost, accessibility and scope. Grenada was not as remote as the Falklands Islands, in 
which the difficulties of transporting and accessing means for broadcasting 
information generated important barriers for war correspondents.  
 
Today, the Internet and mobile personal satellite communications systems enormously 
increase the possibilities of accessing information. ‘Technology shapes the tone and 
substance of the military-press relationship. Technology is at the root of many of the 
military’s security concerns about news coverage’ (Seib, 2004: 47). The 2011 Arab 
Spring showed that nowadays it is possible to access alternative sources of 
information without being in the frontline (Zimmer, 2011). If we consider these new 
technologies, a complete media blackout as occurred in Grenada is much more 
difficult to imagine. However, in 1983 the only chance that journalists had to 
independently access information was by being on the island. The transportation 
requirements and the American Navy’s capacity to monitor a couple of relatively 
small islands made the access to Grenada impossible without military authorization. 
Similarly, the use of digital technologies eliminates the duration of the conflict as a 
variable to be considered in the possibility of broadcasting relevant information. Back 
in 1983 a very short military intervention could create a challenge for news 
organization lacking military support, nowadays the widespread ‘real-time 
communication capabilities have made war a far more transparent enterprise than 
military officials have been accustomed to’ (Seib, 2004: 48). In view of high-tech 
weaponry and global communication, the conflict between the opposing interests of 
the press and the military, that is, the press’ need to inform the public and the 
military’s obligation to conduct war effectively is likely to persist (Cooper, 2003). 
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Media Operations and Governmental strategies  
Media coverage of war and conflict has been commonly understood as a facilitator of 
a public arena in which the media inform the public about the events taking place in 
the battlefield (Taylor, 1997). When the invasion of Grenada took place, the Falklands 
War had recently taken place and the Pentagon looked at British information 
management as an example from which lessons could be learnt. Government and 
military censorship and information management could be applied by restricting 
access to the frontline. Images that could upset the audience and unfavourable reports 
that could be read could be avoided. This approach was materialized in the decision to 
exclude journalists from accessing the island in the two days following the invasion 
thereby imposing strict control over independent information about the US activities 
in Grenada. Journalists trying to arrive at the island by their own means were 
threatened with the use of naval and air force armament (Warden, 1988). 
 
 
The Sidle Panel and Report 
The establishment of a Media-Military Relations Panel appointed by the Pentagon and 
chaired by General Winant Sidle (between 6-10 February 1984 in Washington DC) 
(Office of Assistant Secretary of Defence, 1984) was the government’s response to 
the intense criticism of the reporting restrictions and the tension that developed 
between the media and the US authorities during the Grenada conflict. The main goal 
of the Commission was to find a way to manage media operations and establish 
relations with news organisation in future military interventions. Sidle was asked to 
look at how the United Sates should conduct military operations in a manner that 
safeguards the lives of its military and protects the security of the operation while 
keeping the American public informed through the media (Office of Assistant 
Secretary of Defence, 1984:6).  
 
The major news organizations decided that although they would cooperate fully with 
the panel they would not provide members to the Commission, as it was not deemed 
appropriate for media personnel to serve on a government panel.  Instead the non-
military membership of the panel was composed of experienced retired media 
personnel and representatives of schools of journalism who were experts in military-
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media Relations. The Department of Defence organizations involved agreed to 
provide members from the outset’ (Office of Assistant Secretary of Defence, 1984:6).  
 
In preparation for the hearings, news media organizations and professional journalists 
were sent a letter querying their concerns. ‘The letter included nine questions to be 
used by the commission. Formulated by General Sidle, the questionnaire asked media 
organizations their views on censorship, the First Amendment, the use of press pools 
to cover military operations, accreditation of report for media pools, and logistical 
needs of the different media’ (Campbell, 1989:65).  
 
The majority of the nineteen media representatives who testified before the committee 
requested a return to the procedures that existed prior to the Grenada invasion 
whereas the military members of the panel were looking to develop more formal 
procedures for media coverage of combat operations. The main issue that emerged 
from the various testimonies of both military and media personnel was one of trust. 
With some military officers suspecting the medias’ ethics and patriotism and some 
members of the press suspecting the military of censorship not only for security 
considerations but also for political purposes. 
 
The Sidle panel recommended: integration between military, public affairs and 
operational planning; large pooling system; assessment of the need to pre-establish 
accredited journalists in case of military operations; journalists’ compliance with 
security guidelines; adequate equipment and training for military staff to help media 
coverage; provision of communication facilities and transportation when these do not 
compromise military operations; and better communication and understanding 
between military and media workers ((Sidle, 1984, pp. 166-167, as cited in 
Woodward, 1993, p. 9; see also Cassell, 1985). Journalists and their access to the 
frontline, then, would be coordinated in accordance with the military activities 
supervised by the US commanders. ‘Media representatives that appeared before the 
Sidle panel were against the pooling arrangements in general, but they agreed that 
such arrangements could be necessary for them to obtain early access to an event. 
This sort of arrangement would be used only when the number of media personnel 





These proposals were implemented during the operation to maintain freedom of 
navigation in the Persian Gulf in 1988 (known as Operation Earnest Will). The US 
military involvement in Panama (1989) provided the first opportunity to test 
implementation of the Sidle Panel’s recommendations (Olson, 1992: 522). This latter 
operation proved a disaster for the ‘new’ pooling system because Dick Cheney, then 
Secretary of Defense, obstructed the mobilization of the pool and journalists were 
unable to cover the engagement. Local commanders demanded changes in stories and 
delays in passing dispatches through military channels (Woodward, 1993, pp. 9-10). 
The sixteen-member press pool arrived in Panama four hours after US troops invaded 
and were only allowed to send their first reports after ten hours. 
 
 
The delay in the media’s ability to gain access and report independently – and in the 
case of Grenada days rather than hours  - enables Governments and Military to set the 
terms not only of the initial coverage and debate but of all subsequent treatment of the 
story. These administration spokesmen become the primary definers of topics 
enabling them to establish the initial definition or primary interpretation of the 
conflict in question. The interpretation then ‘commands the field’ in all subsequent 
treatment setting the terms of reference within which all further coverage takes place. 
Although the strength of this  ‘effect’ is disputed, news source analysis would suggest 
that prior to the advent of user generated content, it had a strong degree of efficacy 
(see Hall et all., 1978:58-59, see also Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994: 17). 
 
General Sidle was critical of the exercise and the manner in which his 
recommendations were implemented. Further discussions between military 
commanders and news organizations followed the Panama fiasco and eventually led 
to all future battle plans containing a section on dealing with the media. To some 
extent, this worked reasonably well in the military engagements in Somalia in the 
early nineties and in Haiti in 1994 although the pool system remained unpopular with 
the news organizations (Tumber, 2009). 
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In the Gulf War I (1991) organized pools and formal briefings were the order of the 
day. Journalists were restricted in their travel movements and had to subject their 
copy to formal security review.  To overcome the problem of how to cope with 
hundreds of journalists reporting from the region, the military organized ad -hoc press 
pools.  However many journalists decided to ignore these pools preferring to move 
about independently. The outcome was frustration on behalf of news organizations 
and continuing bewilderment on behalf of the military about how journalists operate 
(Tumber 2009). 
 
Military - media relations went through a further downturn during the Kosovo 
campaign in 1999, a conflict where journalists had little access to the province and 
relied on the military for information about the bombing campaign. For the invasion 
in Afghanistan (2001), many editors, bureau chiefs, and correspondents regarded the 
Pentagon’s reporting rules as some of the toughest ever (see Hickey, 2002). The main 
grievances consisted of the lack of reasonable access to land and sea bases from 
which air attacks on Taliban positions were launched, and the restrictions on access 
and information emanating from the Pentagon.   
 
The mythical legacy of Vietnam was still alive in the recent Iraq War (2003) with 
apprehension on the part of the military and government that the public would react 
badly to pictures of casualties. ‘Commanders and politicians were anxious about the 
effects of displays of bloodied bodies of civilians rather than ones of 'precision strikes 
on legitimate targets', or the media reproduction of photographs showing Iraqi 
prisoners in Abu Ghraib being abused by American guards as occurred in April 2004. 
In the US, there remains a particular fear that body bags containing dead servicemen 
from Iraq or Afghanistan can sap domestic support for the war. This explains why the 
US military transported home in secrecy the bodies of those killed while on duty, with 
no photographs allowed throughout 2003-4, and also explains the military’s acute 
embarrassment when pictures were obtained by newspapers of flag-draped coffins in 
a cargo plane’ (Tumber 2009).  
 
The Sidle commission can be viewed as highly influential because it was an attempt 
not just to placate the press but also to develop a blue print for working relationships 
between the military and media enabling both parties to achieve their relative aims. 
 13 
Media coverage plans and procedures in the Iraq War can be seen as a developed plan 
initiated by the Sidle commission (see Tumber & Palmer 2004:2). Journalists need to 
be accredited and assembled by the military. This creates a mechanism to facilitate the 
relationship with the military forces, but it can also exclude unfriendly journalists 
from areas considered inappropriate by these forces (Andersen, 2007). Safety and 
training courses in preparation for the impending invasion and the embedded 
journalism experience may create greater sympathy with US troops. 
 
Conclusion 
Grenada was the zenith of media control operations following the lessons of the 
Falklands War. These types of operation are not possible any longer because of the 
multiple channels allowing users to generate and distribute content. Although 
journalists and news organisations may still find different obstacles in accessing 
information (as they are in the current conflict in Syria), digital technologies have 
generated new possibilities for producing and broadcasting information that can 
overcome some of these barriers. From mobile phones with cameras to very popular 
blogs and real-time devices, Internet connections have enabled myriad possibilities 
for information to be produced and circulated to journalists’ and non-journalists’ 
networked connections.  
 
Despite the changes in technology the management of domestic public opinion 
compels Governments and military into careful planning, rehearsal and management 
of information from and about any war or conflict. They have to combine methods of 
ensuring a continuous stream of positive media coverage that is ostensibly freely 
gathered by independent journalists and news organizations.  The media policies 
adopted during the invasion of Grenada failed to do this showing that censorship and 
the denial of access diminished the free media claim of the United States and, as 
illustrated by the media’s coverage and comment, and confirmed by the Sidle panel 
during the session and discussions held with military officers and several members of 
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